When philosophers do not have a way out for choosing between the account they defend or a competing one, they usually appeal to theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, unity, fruitfulness, explanatory power, and so on. In this paper, my aim is to question the status of simplicity as a criterion for theory choice. My main arguments are that, first, it is hard to determine an objective metrics for evaluating simplicity, and second, we have no way to decide which one we (...) should prioritize: whether the ontological or the ideological variant of this theoretical virtue. In order to defend this stance, I will present the defenses of both ontological and ideological simplicity and then criticize each of them. I will also point out that the usual appeal metaphysicians make to scientific practice is not enough, given that the role of simplicity in science is not so clear and that philosophy in general has a very distinct nature as an endeavor. In the end, I will sketch a metaphilosophical pessimistic conclusion according to which not just metaphysics, but much of philosophy, is maybe doomed to be an endless effort of inconclusive arguments, since most of philosophical explanations appeal to theoretical virtues as a decisive factor in their disputes. (shrink)

A pergunta fundamental na filosofia do humor é: o que nos faz rir? Neste artigo, defenderemos a chamada teoria da incongruência, segundo a qual o riso é provocado pela apresentação de aspectos inconsistentes em um proferimento. Para isso, analisaremos como a pragmática da linguagem fornece maneiras de apresentar incongruências em piadas escritas e faladas e, consequentemente, de provocar a diversão cômica em uma audiência. Nosso foco será em implicaturas conversacionais, atos de fala e pressuposições, e como eles são usados em (...) piadas. Esta não é uma análise exaustiva de todas as formas como incongruências são geradas em proferimentos cômicos; claro, há outros modos de apresentar desarmonias, tais como por meio aspectos semânticos. Por fim, discutiremos se piadas deveriam ser consideradas um tipo distinto de ato de fala, ao invés de só um uso parasitário da linguagem. (shrink)

It approaches to performance practice in Law from the need of an accountability between law and Philosophy. The application of formal evidence as sufficient phenomenological method to value the case and allow the unveiling of the meaning of things appears as an alternative. It searches an alternative theoretical-philosophical way consistent to guide a sufficient interpretative research for the Law. It takes as theoretical basis, the Ontological-Existential Hermeneutics (Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer), facing of the filtering of Hermeneutics Law Criticism of (...) Lenio Streck, trying to point out the relevance of the "hermeneutic situation" in any interpretive act. (shrink)

Sobre a continuidade metodológica em Michel Foucault: da fundamentação de uma teoria do enunciado para o cuidado de si Resumo: Uma das dificuldades em se compreender a categoria de enunciado no pensamento de Michel Foucault está relacionada com múltiplas definições tautológicas dessa categoria no livro A arqueologia do saber. O primeiro objetivo deste artigo é oferecer uma descrição do enunciado e sua íntima dependência do nível referencial no pensamento arqueológico de Michel Foucault. O segundo objetivo, interrelacionado ao primeiro objetivo, será (...) mostrar o quanto as reflexões que desembocaram na concepção “cuidado de si”, vieram à tona porque o fim da análise arqueológica é a reconstituição das práticas concretas de uma época que definiram as condições do dizer e evidenciavam os modos de saber, pois o nível referencial é o nível de maior relevância para a reconstituição histórica das práticas discursivas por fontes discursivas. Esse método trouxe à luz, a ideia de que o trabalho fundamental da arte, de que temos de cuidar, a área principal à qual se deve aplicar valores estéticos, é a si próprio, à própria existência. Consequentemente, para esse pesquisador, não temos que escolher entre o nosso mundo e o mundo grego, desde que se possa ver que alguns dos princípios mais importantes de nossa ética têm sido relacionados num certo momento a uma estética da existência. Palavras-chave: Enunciado; Referencial; Formação dos objetos; Cuidado de si; Foucault. On the methodological continuity in Michel Foucault: from the foundation of a theory of the statement to the care of the self Abstract: One of the difficulties in understanding the category of enunciation in Michel Foucault's thought is related to multiple tautological definitions of this category in the book The archeology of knowledge. The first objective of this article is to offer a description of the statement and its intimate dependence on the referential level in Michel Foucault's archaeological thought. The second objective, interrelated to the first objective, will show how the reflections that led to the concept of “self-care”, came to light because the end of the archaeological analysis is the reconstitution of the concrete practices of an era that defined the conditions of saying and evidenced the ways of knowing, because the referential level is the most relevant level for the historical reconstruction of discursive practices by discursive sources. This method brought to light, the idea that the fundamental work of art, that we have to take care of, the main area to which aesthetic values ​​must be applied, is itself, to existence itself. Consequently, for this researcher, we do not have to choose between our world and the Greek world, as long as it can be seen that some of the most important principles of our ethics have been related at a certain moment to an aesthetics of existence. Key-words: Statement; Referential; Formation of objects; Self-care; Foucault. Sobre la continuidad metodológica en Michel Foucault: de la fundación de una teoría del enunciado al cuidado del yo Resumen: Una de las dificultades para comprender la categoría de enunciaciado en el pensamiento de Michel Foucault está relacionada con las múltiples definiciones tautológicas de esta categoría en el libro La arqueología del saber. El primer objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una descripción del enunciado y su íntima dependencia del nivel referencial en el pensamiento arqueológico de Michel Foucault. El segundo objetivo, interrelacionado con el primero, será mostrar cómo las reflexiones que llevaron al concepto de “cuidado de sií”, salieron a la luz porque el fin del análisis arqueológico es la reconstitución de las prácticas concretas de una época que definió las condiciones del decir y evidenció las formas de conocer, porque el nivel referencial es el nivel más relevante para la reconstrucción histórica de prácticas discursivas por fuentes discursivas. Este método sacó a la luz la idea de que la obra de arte fundamental, que tenemos que cuidar, el ámbito principal al que se deben aplicar los valores estéticos, es ella misma, la existencia misma. En consecuencia, para este investigador, no tenemos que elegir entre nuestro mundo y el mundo griego, siempre y cuando se pueda constatar que algunos de los principios más importantes de nuestra ética se han relacionado en un momento determinado con una estética de la existencia. Palabra clave: Enunciado; Referencial; Formación de objetos; Cuidado de sí; Foucault. Data de registro: 24/02/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021. (shrink)

This scoping review mapped the academic literature focused on the therapeutic itinerary of children who seek care in health services and proposed an explanatory model to expand the concept and classification of these health itineraries. A total of 789 articles were reviewed, of which 28 were eligible for inclusion. In these 28 it was possible to observe that the child's therapeutic itinerary is more than a physical path, but also encompasses all choices within a specific social and cultural environment in (...) which the child is inserted. Our proposal is to expand the concept beyond the therapeutic, classifying the itinerary also according to the objective, the decision‐making agent, respect for the presence of company, the health subsystem used, according to the physical continuity of the itinerary, the perception of efficacy of the patient, the nature of the illness, the administration of healthcare, the means of transport used, the person providing information about the itinerary, the planning of the itinerary and its completeness. Knowing the child's itineraries toward healthcare allows the development of innovative discourses and practices for future public policies, through which the principles of comprehensiveness and resoluteness in children's health would be strengthened. There is still a need to deepen knowledge about the meanings and feelings regarding their interpretations of the events suffered in childhood. (shrink)

This is a critical analysis of Scientific Realism and Laws of Nature: A Metaphysics of Causal Powers, by Michel Ghins.

The lack of public support for climate change policies and refusals to vaccinate children are just two alarming illustrations of the impacts of dissent about scientific claims. Dissent can lead to confusion, false beliefs, and widespread public doubt about highly justified scientific evidence. Even more dangerously, it has begun to corrode the very authority of scientific consensus and knowledge. Deployed aggressively and to political ends, some dissent can intimidate scientists, stymie research, and lead both the public and policymakers to oppose (...) important public policies firmly rooted in science. -/- To criticize dissent is, however, a fraught exercise. Skepticism and fearless debate are key to the scientific process, making it both vital and incredibly difficult to characterize and identify dissent that is problematic in its approach and consequences. Indeed, as de Melo-Martín and Intemann show, the criteria commonly proposed as means of identifying inappropriate dissent are flawed and the strategies generally recommended to tackle such dissent are not only ineffective but could even make the situation worse. -/- The Fight Against Doubt proposes that progress on this front can best be achieved by enhancing the trustworthiness of the scientific community and by being more realistic about the limits of science when it comes to policymaking. It shows that a richer understanding of the context in which science operates is needed to disarm problematic dissent and those who deploy it. This, the authors argue, is the best way forward, rather than diagnosing the many instances of wrong-headed dissent. (shrink)

Reprogenetic technologies, which combine the power of reproductive techniques with the tools of genetic science and technology, promise prospective parents a remarkable degree of control to pick and choose the likely characteristics of their offspring. Not only can they select embryos with or without particular genetically-related diseases and disabilities but also choose embryos with non-disease related traits such as sex. -/- Prominent authors such as Agar, Buchanan, DeGrazia, Green, Harris, Robertson, Savulescu, and Silver have flocked to the banner of reprogenetics. (...) For them, increased reproductive choice and reduced suffering through the elimination of genetic disease and disability are just the first step. They advocate use of these technologies to create beings who enjoy longer and healthier lives, possess greater intellectual capacities, and are capable of more refined emotional experiences. Indeed, Harris and Savulescu in particular take reprogenetic technologies to be so valuable to human beings that they have insisted that their use is not only morally permissible but morally required. -/- Rethinking Reprogenetics challenges this mainstream view with a contextualised, gender-attentive philosophical perspective. De Melo-Martín demonstrates that you do not have to be a Luddite, social conservative, or religious zealot to resist the siren song of reprogenetics. Pointing out the flawed nature of the arguments put forward by the technologies' proponents, Rethinking Reprogenetics reveals the problematic nature of the assumptions underpinning current evaluations of these technologies and offers a framework for a more critical and skeptical assessment. (shrink)

When philosophers do not have a way out for choosing between the account they defend or a competing one, they usually appeal to theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, unity, fruitfulness, explanatory power, and so on. In this paper, my aim is to question the status of simplicity as a criterion for theory choice. My main arguments are that, first, it is hard to determine an objective metrics for evaluating simplicity, and second, we have no way to decide which one we (...) should prioritize: whether the ontological or the ideological variant of this theoretical virtue. In order to defend this stance, I will present the defenses of both ontological and ideological simplicity and then criticize each of them. I will also point out that the usual appeal metaphysicians make to scientific practice is not enough, given that the role of simplicity in science is not so clear and that philosophy in general has a very distinct nature as an endeavor. In the end, I will sketch a metaphilosophical pessimistic conclusion according to which not just metaphysics, but much of philosophy, is maybe doomed to be an endless effort of inconclusive arguments, since most of philosophical explanations appeal to theoretical virtues as a decisive factor in their disputes. (shrink)

The argument from inductive risk has been embraced by many as a successful account of the role of values in science that challenges the value-free ideal. We argue that it is not obvious that the argument from inductive risk actually undermines the value-free ideal. This is because the inductive risk argument endorses an assumption held by proponents of the value-free ideal: that contextual values never play an appropriate role in determining evidence. We show that challenging the value-free ideal ultimately requires (...) rejecting this assumption. (shrink)

The use of genome embryo editing tools in reproduction is often touted as a way to ensure the birth of healthy and genetically related children. Many would agree that this is a worthy goal. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, if we are concerned with justice, accepting such goal as morally appropriate commits one to rejecting the development of embryo editing for reproductive purposes. This is so because safer and more effective means exist that can allow many (...) more prospective parents to achieve the same valued goal and that offer additional benefits. (shrink)

Philosophers of science, particularly those working on science and values, often talk about the need for science to be socially responsible. However, what this means is not clear. In this paper, we review the contributions of philosophers of science to the debate over socially responsible science and explore the dimensions that a fruitful account of socially responsible science should address. Our review shows that offering a comprehensive account is difficult. We contend that broad calls for socially responsible science that fail (...) to attend to relevant dimensions are not the solution, as they preclude meaningful changes to research institutions and practices. We conclude that narrower, more explicit accounts are more likely to lead to substantive transformation. (shrink)

The therapeutic misconception has been seen as presenting an ethical problem because failure to distinguish the aims of research participation from those receiving ordinary treatment may seriously undermine the informed consent of research subjects. Hence, most theoretical and empirical work on the problems of the therapeutic misconception has been directed to evaluate whether, and to what degree, this confusion invalidates the consent of subjects. We argue here that this focus on the understanding component of informed consent, while important, might be (...) too narrow to capture the ethical complexity of the therapeutic misconception. We show that concerns about misplaced trust and exploitation of such trust are also relevant, and ought to be taken into account, when considering why the therapeutic misconception matters ethically. (shrink)

Although science is our most reliable producer of knowledge, it can also be used to create ignorance, unjustified doubt, and misinformation. In doing so, agnotological practices result not only in epistemic harms but also in social ones. A way to prevent or minimise such harms is to impede these ignorance-producing practices. In this paper, I explore various challenges to such a proposal. I first argue that reliably identifying agnotological practices in a way that permits the prevention of relevant harms is (...) more difficult than it might appear. I focus on an identifying criterion that many find apt for the task: bad faith motives. I then consider an objection—that reliable criteria are unnecessary to successfully address the concerns raised by agnotological strategies—and I show that it fails. I conclude by exploring other ways of conceptualising the problems attributed to agnotological practices. In particular, I challenge the focus on misinformation as the main problem of concern. (shrink)

Recently, some have proposed moral bioenhancement as a solution to the serious moral evils that humans face. Seemingly disillusioned with traditional methods of moral education, proponents of bioenhancement believe that we should pursue and apply biotechnological means to morally enhance human beings. Such proposal has generated a lively debate about the permissibility of moral bioenhancement. We argue here that such debate is specious. The claim that moral bioenhancement is a solution - whether permissible or not - to the serious moral (...) problems that affect human beings is based on several problematic framing assumptions. We evaluate here three of such assumptions: the first rests on a contested understanding of morality, the second consist in a mistaken conception of human moral problems, and the third relates to problematic presuppositions grounding the interpretation of existent scientific evidence presented to defend moral bioenhancement. Once these framing assumptions are identified and critically evaluated, it becomes clear that the moral bioenhancement debate is misguided. (shrink)

A growing number of jurisdictions hold that gamete donors must be identifiable to the children born with their eggs or sperm, on grounds that being able to know about one's genetic origins is a fundamental moral right. But the argument for that belief has not yet been adequately made.

A new reprogenetic technology, mitochondrial replacement, is making its appearance and, unsurprisingly given its promise to wash off our earthly stains --or at least the scourges of sexual reproduction--, John Harris finds only reasons to celebrate this new scientific feat.1 In fact, he finds mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) so “unreservedly welcome” that he believes those who reject them suffer from “a large degree of desperation and not a little callousness.”2 Believing myself to be neither desperate nor callous, but finding myself (...) also no closer at all – not even after reading his article—to following Harris in welcoming these technologies wholeheartedly, it seems appropriate to respond. (shrink)

Proponents of moral enhancement believe that we should pursue and apply biotechnological means to morally enhance human beings, as failing to do so is likely to lead to humanity's demise. Unsurprisingly, these proposals have generated a substantial amount of debate about the moral permissibility of using such interventions. Here I put aside concerns about the permissibility of moral enhancement and focus on the conceptual and evidentiary grounds for the moral enhancement project. I argue that such grounds are quite precarious.

O artigo apresenta uma reflexão sobre a implementação das políticas públicas e sua relação com os distintos territórios, evidenciando as particularidades e os constrangimentos que afetam os resultados das políticas em nível local. Tomando como referência empírica o contexto de expansão e difusão da Covid-19 na Região do Alto Jacuí, localizada no noroeste do Rio Grande do Sul (RS), Brasil, buscou-se analisar como as diferentes dinâmicas sociais e econômicas existentes nesse território (porte dos municípios, centralidade regional, atividades econômicas, vias de (...) transporte), bem como a organização e a infraestrutura referente a área da saúde (regionalização dos serviços, oferta de leitos hospitalares e unidades de terapias intensivas, disponibilidade de profissionais especializados), produziram condicionamentos locais às formas de enfrentamento da pandemia da Covid-19 e sua expansão. Os dados que embasaram as análises foram capturados no Portal Coronavírus do RS, disponibilizados pela Secretária Estadual da Saúde do Rio Grande do Sul, pelo Ministério da Saúde e pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística. (shrink)

Science is our most reliable producer of knowledge. Nonetheless, a significant amount of evidence shows that pluralities of members of publics question a variety of accepted scientific claims as well as policies and recommendation informed by the scientific evidence. Scientific misinformation is considered to play a central role in this state of affairs. In this paper, I challenge the emphasis on misinformation as a primary culprit on two grounds. First, the phenomenon of misinformation is far less clear than what much (...) discussion about the topic would lead one to believe. The evidence regarding the amount of misinformation that exits as well as its role in people’s harmful behaviors is at best conflicting and at worst completely useless. Second, the prominence given to misinformation and its harms on people’s behaviors disregards the role of values in policymaking and treats scientific information as if it were the only information necessary to make policy decisions. At a minimum, these problems call for caution regarding the emphasis on this phenomenon. After all, if the problem is incorrectly diagnosed, the solutions that are being offered to address the problem of misinformation are bound to at best inadequate and at worst dangerous. (shrink)

Because of the important benefits that biomedical research offers to humans, some have argued that people have a general moral obligation to participate in research. Although the defense of such a putative moral duty has raised controversy, few scholars, on either side of the debate, have attended to the social context in which research takes place and where such an obligation will be discharged. By reflecting on the social context in which a presumed duty to participate in research will obtain, (...) this article shows that decontextualized discussions of this putative moral obligation are problematic. (shrink)

The disclosure policies of scientific journals now require that investigators provide information about financial interests relevant to their research. The main goals of these policies are to prevent bias from occurring, to help identify bias when it occurs, and to avoid the appearance of bias. We argue here that such policies do little to help achieve these goals, and we suggest more effective alternatives.

Many have argued that allowing and encouraging public avenues for dissent and critical evaluation of scientific research is a necessary condition for promoting the objectivity of scientific communities and advancing scientific knowledge . The history of science reveals many cases where an existing scientific consensus was later shown to be wrong . Dissent plays a crucial role in uncovering potential problems and limitations of consensus views. Thus, many have argued that scientific communities ought to increase opportunities for dissenting views to (...) be heard and taken seriously. Such opportunities are necessary for both limiting the influence .. (shrink)

Neste texto, procuro encontrar as origens de um dos mais importantes conceitos de Gilles Deleuze, o conceito de Imagem-tempo. Este conceito remete-nos para os primeiros textos de Deleuze dedicados à filosofia de Espinosa e ao problema do autómato espiritual e relaciona-se directamente com o problema da passividade/actividade do espectador. Ou seja, o conceito crucial na sua filosofia do cinema, a Imagem-tempo, esconde uma importante reflexão sobre a Imagem cinematográfica como arte de massas, os (im)poderes do pensamento e o modo fascista (...) de se pensar. This text seeks to find the origins of one of the most important of Gilles Deleuze's concepts, the concept of Time-image. This concept leads us to his first texts regarding Spinoza's philosophy and the problem of the spiritual automaton, and concerns directly with the problem of passivity/activity of the film goer. That is to say that the crucial concept of his film philosophy, Time-image, hides a fundamental consideration on the cinematic image as a mass art, the (un)powers of thinking and the fascist way of thought. (shrink)

No presente artigo proponho-me a reconstruir, o mais claramente possível o “paradoxo cético” a partir do modo como apresentado por Saul Kripke em seu Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Seu argumento sustenta que não há fatos ou razões que justifiquem nosso emprego de termos como dotados de significados. Para tanto, interponho as distinções que julgo pertinentes à adequada compreensão do tema, formulando os requisitos necessários à sua adequada resposta, a saber, o ontológico, o normativo e o da identificação (...) extensional no tempo. Ao final, contrasto o ceticismo ora objeto de análise com sua versão epistemológica clássica. AbstractIn the present paper I propose to rebuild as clearly as possible the “skeptical paradox” from the way presented by Saul Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). His argument maintains that there are no facts or reasons justifying our use of terms as having meaning. Therefore, I interpose the distinctions that I consider relevant to the proper understanding of the subject and I formulate the requirements necessary for its proper response, namely the ontological, the normative and the extensional identification in time. Finally, I contrast semantic skepticism with its classical epistemological version. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to examine critically Julian Savulescu's claim that people should select, of the possible children they could have, the one who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available genetic information, including information about non‐disease genes. I argue here that in defending this moral obligation, Savulescu has neglected several important issues such as access to selection technologies, disproportionate burdens on women, (...) difficulties in determining what is best, problems with aggregate effects of individual choices, and questions about social justice. Taking these matters into account would call such a moral requirement into serious question. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 5, Page 3-3, September–October 2022.

Recent advances in biotechnologies have led to speculations about enhancing human beings. Many of the moral arguments presented to defend human enhancement technologies have been limited to discussions of their risks and benefits. The author argues that in so far as ethical arguments focus primarily on risks and benefits of human enhancement technologies, these arguments will be insufficient to provide a robust defence of these technologies. This is so because the belief that an assessment of risks and benefits is a (...) sufficient ethical evaluation of these technologies incorrectly presupposes that risk assessments do not involve value judgements. Second, it presupposes a reductionist conception of ethics as merely a risk management instrument. Each of these assumptions separates ethical evaluation from discussion and appraisal of ends and means and thus leaves important—indeed, essential—ethical considerations out of view. Once these problematic assumptions are rejected, it becomes clear that an adequate defence of human enhancement technologies requires more than a simple balance of their risks and benefits. (shrink)

According to sparse modalism, the notion of essence can be analysed in terms of necessity and naturalness. In this paper, I develop and defend a version of sparse modalism that is equipped with a non-standard, relativized conception of naturalness. According to this conception, properties and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different kinds of things, and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different slots. I argue that this relativized version of sparse modalism can accommodate (...) various cases that the standard, non-relativized version can’t. The alternative version can accommodate cases where a relation is essential to a relatum but merely necessary to another, cases where a property is essential to an object but merely necessary to another, and cases where a less-than-perfectly natural property is essential to an object. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have come to accept that contextual values can play unavoidable and desirable roles in science. This has raised concerns about the need to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate value influences in scientific inquiry. I discuss here four such concerns: epistemic distortion, value imposition, undermining of public trust in science, and the use of objectionable values. I contend that preserving epistemic integrity and avoiding value imposition provide good reasons to attempt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate influences of values (...) in science. However, the trust and the objectionable values concerns constitute no good reason for demarcation criteria. (shrink)

Several feminist philosophers of science have argued that social and political values are compatible with, and may even enhance, scientific objectivity. A variety of normative recommendations have emerged regarding how to identify, manage, and critically evaluate social values in science. In particular, several feminist theorists have argued that scientific communities ought to: 1) include researchers with diverse experiences, interests, and values, with equal opportunity and authority to scrutinize research; 2) investigate or "study up" scientific phenomena from the perspectives, interests, and (...) conditions of marginalized stakeholders potentially affected by the research; and 3) make gender, ethnicity, class, and geographical location "visible," or use them as categories of analysis when appropriate. Yet, more work is needed to determine what exactly these recommendations would require, and the benefits they would yield, in specific research contexts. Using the recent development of the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines, we examine how these three feminist recommendations would have applied. We argue that these principles would have yielded several epistemic and social benefits in the HPV case, as well as in biomedical research more generally. That is, biomedical research guided by these principles would not only be epistemically superior, but also more socially responsible. (shrink)

Although surprising to some proponents of sex selection for non-medical reasons (Dahl 2005), a considerable amount of critical debate has been raised by this practice (Blyth, Frith, and Crawshaw 2008; Dawson and Trounson 1996; Dickens 2002; Harris 2005; Heyd 2003; Holm 2004; Macklin 2010; Malpani 2002; McDougall 2005; Purdy 2007; Seavilleklein and Sherwin 2007; Steinbock 2002; Strange and Chadwick 2010; Wilkinson 2008). While abortion or infanticide has long been used as means of sex selection, a new technology—preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)—has (...) become a highly efficient, and arguably less controversial, way of ensuring the birth of a child of a particular sex. PGD, used in combination with in vitro .. (shrink)

Varro's De lingua Latina is a treasure trove of information. Of the originally twenty-five books, six have come down to us more or less complete. Among these, Books 5–7 give us many hundreds of etymologies, and Books 8–10 discuss the question whether Latin morphology is regular or not. What Varro rarely comments on is sociolinguistic variation. The sociolinguistic comments in Varro's work can almost be counted on one hand. For instance, in 5.162 Varro remarks that cenaculum, from cena ‘dinner’, means (...) ‘attic’ in Roman Latin, but that the original meaning was, as one might expect, ‘dining-room’, a meaning preserved in the non-Roman dialects of Latium, Falerii and Corduba in Spain; the meaning also lives on in religious uses in Lanuvium. In 7.96, Varro tells us that some words are pronounced with -ae- by some, but with -ē- by others. We know that non-Roman varieties of Latin monophthongized -ae- earlier than the Roman dialect did. Varro mentions pairs like scaena / scēna ‘stage’, a loan from Greek σκηνή, which shows that -ae- is hypercorrect here. Interestingly, only in one such pair is the variant with -ē- ascribed to country people, in the name Maesius / Mēsius, and this is indeed the only pair where the diphthong -ae- is original rather than the result of hypercorrection. (shrink)

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced recently that food products derived from some animal clones and their offspring are safe for human consumption. In response to criticism that it had failed to engage with ethical, social, and economic concerns raised by livestock cloning, the FDA argued that addressing normative issues prior to issuing a final ruling on animal cloning is not part of its mission. In this article, the authors reject the FDA's claim that its mission to protect (...) and advance public health can be accomplished without considering ethical issues or without making value judgments. The authors offer two arguments in support of their position. First, the agency's mission statement presupposes significant normative commitments and judgments. Second, the FDA's risk assessment of food products from cloned animals and their offspring is itself clearly shaped by a variety of normative commitments. (shrink)

It is argued here that bioethicists might inadvertently be promoting genetic determinism: the idea that genes alone determine human traits and behaviours. Discussions about genetic testing are used to exemplify how they might be doing so. Quite often bioethicists use clinical cases to support particular moral obligations or rights as if these cases were representative of the kind of information we can acquire about human diseases through genetic testing, when they are not. On other occasions, the clinical cases are presented (...) in simplistic ways that portray genetic testing as yielding information more accurate than it actually is. It is concluded that, because of the problematic implications that the ideology of genetic determinism might have for individuals’ wellbeing and for our public policies, bioethicists should be careful to present these issues in ways that do not promote questionable ideas about the causal role of genes in human diseases and behaviours. (shrink)

Despite increasing recognition of the ways in which ethical and social values play a role in science (Kitcher 2001; Longino 1990, 2002), scientists are often still reluctant to acknowledge or discuss ethical and social values at stake in their research. Even when research is closely connected to developing public policy, it is generally held that it should be empirical data, and not the values of scientists, that inform policy. According to this view, scientists need not, and should not, endorse non-epistemic (...) values related to their research, as doing so may bias their assessment of what the evidence is. As a result, debates over science-based policy tend to be construed solely as empirical discussions to be .. (shrink)

Discussions about whether new biomedical technologies threaten or violate human dignity are now common. Indeed, appeals to human dignity have played a central role in national and international debates about whether to allow particular kinds of biomedical investigations. The focus of this paper is on chimera research. I argue here that both those who claim that particular types of human-nonhuman chimera research threaten human dignity and those who argue that such threat does not exist fail to make their case. I (...) first introduce some of the arguments that have been offered supporting the claim that the creation of certain sorts of chimeras threatens or violates human dignity. I next present opponents' assessments of such arguments. Finally I critically analyze both the critics' and the supporters' claims about whether chimera research threatens human dignity. (shrink)

A significant amount of scientific evidence shows that childhood vaccination constitutes one of the most successful and cost-effective public health interventions of the last century. It has saved millions of lives. Nonetheless, many parents are reluctant or outright hostile to having their children vaccinated. Similarly, in spite of the fact that vaccines against SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, are highly effective in protecting people against death and serious illness, about a third of adults in the United States are still (...) unvaccinated as of July 2022. What leads people to be skeptical of vaccines or to refuse them altogether?The dominant narrative answering this... (shrink)

It is argued here that bioethicists might inadvertently be promoting genetic determinism: the idea that genes alone determine human traits and behaviours. Discussions about genetic testing are used to exemplify how they might be doing so. Quite often bioethicists use clinical cases to support particular moral obligations or rights as if these cases were representative of the kind of information we can acquire about human diseases through genetic testing, when they are not. On other occasions, the clinical cases are presented (...) in simplistic ways that portray genetic testing as yielding information more accurate than it actually is. It is concluded that, because of the problematic implications that the ideology of genetic determinism might have for individuals’ wellbeing and for our public policies, bioethicists should be careful to present these issues in ways that do not promote questionable ideas about the causal role of genes in human diseases and behaviours. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to examine critically Julian Savulescu's claim that people should select, of the possible children they could have, the one who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available genetic information, including information about non‐disease genes. I argue here that in defending this moral obligation, Savulescu has neglected several important issues such as access to selection technologies, disproportionate burdens on women, (...) difficulties in determining what is best, problems with aggregate effects of individual choices, and questions about social justice. Taking these matters into account would call such a moral requirement into serious question. (shrink)

Book Symposium on Andrew Feenberg’s Between Reason and Experience: Essays in Technology and Modernity Content Type Journal Article Pages 203-226 DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0017-8 Authors Inmaculada de Melo-Martín, Division of Medical Ethics, Weill Cornell Medical College, New York, NY 10065, USA David B. Ingram, Loyola University Chicago, 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626, USA Sally Wyatt, e-Humanities Group, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) & Maastricht University, Cruquiusweg 31, 1019 AT Amsterdam, The Netherlands Yoko Arisaka, Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie (...) Hannover, Gerberstrasse 26, 30169 Hannover, Germany Andrew Feenberg, School of Communication, Simon Fraser University at Harbour Centre, 515 West Hastings Street, Vancouver, BC V6B 5K3, Canada Journal Philosophy & Technology Online ISSN 2210-5441 Print ISSN 2210-5433 Journal Volume Volume 24 Journal Issue Volume 24, Number 2. (shrink)

O que pode dizer um homem que fez o voto de se dedicar a Deus a outro que está plenamente convencido de Deus não existe? O que pode ouvir um crente de um ateu? O que um ateu pode aprender? São questões assim que guiaram o encontro entre o padre Fábio de Melo e o historiador Leandro Karnal e resultaram neste livro. Um debate rico e respeitoso entre um cético e um católico que oferece uma referência importante aos brasileiros (...) crentes e não crentes. Com coragem para provocar um ao outro e humildade para aceitar os argumentos, os autores discutiram pontos fundamentais, como se o mundo é melhor ou pior sem Deus e se a religião ajuda ou atrapalha. Questionaram o quanto a fé faz falta e discutiram as esperanças, os medos e a morte no horizonte de quem crê e quem não crê. Crer ou não crer é o resultado de muitas horas de conversa entre um dos padres mais amados do país com um dos mais populares historiadores. Uma obra que irá agradar e enriquecer milhões de leitores. (shrink)